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Abstract
Two persistent myths in epidemiology are that we can use a list of "causal criteria" to provide an
algorithmic approach to inferring causation and that a modern "counterfactual model" can assist in
the same endeavor. We argue that these are neither criteria nor a model, but that lists of causal
considerations and formalizations of the counterfactual definition of causation are nevertheless useful
tools for promoting scientific thinking. They set us on the path to the common sense of scientific
inquiry, including testing hypotheses (really putting them to a test, not just calculating simplistic
statistics), responding to the Duhem-Quine problem, and avoiding many common errors. Austin
Bradford Hill's famous considerations are thus both over-interpreted by those who would use
them as criteria and under-appreciated by those who dismiss them as flawed. Similarly,
formalizations of counterfactuals are under-appreciated as lessons in basic scientific thinking. The
need for lessons in scientific common sense is great in epidemiology, which is taught largely as an
engineering discipline and practiced largely as technical tasks, making attention to core principles
of scientific inquiry woefully rare.
Background
An interesting persistent myth in epidemiology is that
Austin Bradford Hill, the committee preparing the origi-
nal United States Surgeon General's report on smoking,
Mervyn Susser, or other authors have provided us a set of
criteria for identifying cause-effect relations. This notion is
remarkably robust given that these lists clearly do not
meet usual definitions of criteria, which imply some sort
of rule or test. Even when authors who invoke the "Brad-
ford Hill criteria" yield to the scolding of various authors
(including us [1]), and dutifully use Hill's word – "consid-
erations" – rather than "criteria", they still seem to be in
search of the elusive criteria.
A mythology to come into vogue more recently is that
there is some "counterfactual model" that can help us to
better recognize and understand causation in epidemiol-
ogy. Just as causal criteria are not criteria, formal presenta-
tion of counterfactuals does not meet the definition of
model, which can be thought of as a schematic or repre-
sentation that captures part of the essence of a more com-
plicated system in a way that leads to emergent properties.
In these pages, Höfler [2] took on the goal of trying to bet-
ter understand Hill's considerations [3] by invoking a
counterfactual model. As might be surmised from the
above, we do not consider this to be a promising pursuit.
We argue that causal considerations and the counterfac-
tual conceptualization are both useful, but not in ways
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that support an analysis like Höfler's. Nevertheless, Höfler
does provide what is possibly the best one-sentence
assessment of the concept of causal criteria, and nicely
(though perhaps inadvertently) helps argue the case that
causal considerations and counterfactuals are, more than
anything else, guideposts on the road to common sense.
Analysis
Not criteria
"Criteria" is sometimes defined overly broadly to include
anything you might want to think about when making a
decision (that is, as a synonym for "considerations"). But
most definitions include a reference to a test, basis for
judgment, or condition (and anyone trying to "apply" a
set of criteria to make a determination must have such a
definition in mind). Clearly, causal considerations do not
meet these tighter definitions of criteria. There is no
method for determining whether or how well each con-
sideration is met (for example, researchers seem able to
concoct some biological story to explain any association
in their data; how absurd does it have to be before there is
no biological plausibility?), let alone how we would
aggregate any such scores for individual considerations
into an ultimate decision about cause and effect. This
tends to be obscured when commentators' main criti-
cisms are that the proposed conditions are neither neces-
sary nor sufficient, overlooking the salient fact that they
are not actually well-defined conditions (and thus can be
neither necessary nor sufficient, nor can they be non-nec-
essary or non-sufficient).
With that in mind, it is instructive to consider the impli-
cations of authors providing worldly examples of causal
conditions being met as evidence for the conditions being
either informative or misleading, or of attempts like
Höfler's to improve the application of criteria. Those
authors clearly have in mind some standard for judging
whether a condition is met and whether a relationship is
causal. The latter assessment must be independent of the
criteria (since it is meant to validate the usefulness of the
criteria) and, most importantly, is presumably meant to
be something most readers would agree upon. This sug-
gests a presumption of shared common sense. Poole [4,5],
inspired by Thomas Kuhn [6,7], suggests that rather than
criteria, causal considerations are "values" which different
scientists can hold to different degrees. Values are bases
for making worldly conclusions, but tend to lack scoring
systems and other elements of algorithms, and any claims
based on them are subject to interpretation and scrutiny.
Indeed, the empirical and experimental evidence Poole
cites makes clear that epidemiologists' interpretations of
the considerations vary substantially [8-14]. But debates
among scientists about which values are legitimate sug-
gest a feeling that there should be some shared scientific
common sense, rather than persistent heterogeneity of
values.
Neither Hill's nor any other list can codify common sense,
but it can introduce some of it and thereby provide a start-
ing point. This is quite useful since common sense is dis-
turbingly uncommon and thus in need of whatever help
it can get. For researchers who fail to consider, say, consist-
ency across studies or coherence with previous knowledge
in their assessment of causation, and proudly declare that
"our research is the first to show that exposure E causes
disease D, contrary to numerous previous findings," Hill's
lesson in common sense has immediate value. Attending
to Hill's or others' causal considerations would encourage
anyone writing, "our research is the first to show X...," to
follow it – as they almost always should – with, "...so X is
probably not true."
Of course, common sense is most useful in simple cases,
while modeling (e.g., drawing diagrams of causal path-
ways) becomes more critical as a system becomes more
complex. Höfler observes that "the heuristic value of Hill's
considerations converges to zero as the complexity of a
causal system and the uncertainty about the true causal
system increase" [2]. This may be the definitive observa-
tion about causal criteria/considerations. To venture a
simpler paraphrase, lists of causal considerations are
pretty good rules of thumb when the system being
assessed is simple, but in cases where an assessment of
causation demands more than common sense, these lists
are not going to be terribly useful. Höfler goes on to try to
improve on Hill's list to make it more useful in compli-
cated cases, but we think he was right the first time: in a
complicated system the list can only serve as a tool for
teaching scientific common sense, and no matter how we
try to dress it up, it cannot serve as a checklist, algorithm,
or method.
Not a model
The use of the term "model" in the previous paragraph
illustrates its meaning. Causal diagrams take as inputs
some of the known or postulated elements of a worldly
system of causes and effects and schematize them in a way
that new knowledge (i.e., beyond the inputs themselves)
can be extracted. In this sense, a small three-dimensional
scale version of an airplane is a model (because, for exam-
ple, we can put it in a wind tunnel and learn something
about the actual airplane that we did not know when we
made the model) but a photograph of the plane is not a
model (at least not in any obvious way). Neither is the
phrase "heavier-than-air, fixed-wing, self-propelled flying
vehicles" a model. The phrase is informative about air-
planes, but in a different way from a model: it is the defi-
nition of airplanes. We need to have that phrase (or some
variation) in mind before it even makes sense to talkEmerging Themes in Epidemiology 2006, 3:5 http://www.ete-online.com/content/3/1/5
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about airplanes, let alone model them. It might be useful
to refer back to the definition if, during an assessment of
airplanes, we somehow lost touch with the class of things
we are talking about. But the definition is not a model; it
does not offer a way to extract any information that is not
merely an input into it, such as assessing how airworthy a
particular airplane is. Indeed, it cannot in itself help us
determine if a particular object really makes the cut (e.g.,
that it can really fly).
In that spirit, what many authors, including Höfler, mis-
takenly call the "counterfactual model of causation" can
easily be seen to be a definition, not a model. There is an
extensive philosophical literature on what the verb
"cause" means (including when it is implicit in many
other verbs or phrases such as "increases", "leads to", and
"protects against" [15]). These discussions include alter-
native definitions as well as arguments that the word actu-
ally has no definitional teeth. But in the everyday practical
world of epidemiology (a field we define broadly to
include empirical and experimental research on diseases
and health-related exposures with people as the unit of
analysis), we would venture to say that most everyone
who uses causal language is implicitly invoking the coun-
terfactual definition, "but for E, D will not occur or would
not have occurred, but given E it will/would have"
(described in more detail and with more symbolic logic
by Höfler and many other authors; see in particular Mal-
donado and Greenland's "Estimating Causal
Effects"[16]). We cannot think of any use of the word
"cause" in epidemiology (in the research and its policy
implications, excluding purely philosophical discussions)
where the author seemed to have something else in mind.
This does not mean that careful attention to the definition
is worthless. Maldonado, a leading proponent and teacher
in epidemiology of the formal counterfactual definition
and its implications (and who refers to the "counterfac-
tual approach", "concept", or "definition", but not
"model"), has pointed out that it aids us in, among other
things, specifying epidemiologic questions, assessing
which statistics are genuine measures of effect, designing
studies, and defining confounding. Much of this, how-
ever, is arguably scientific common sense (see further dis-
cussion below), not of the "values" sort, but in the form
of first- or second-order logical inferences that scientists
should intuitively grasp. But, again, since common sense
may be woefully uncommon, the formalizations by Mal-
donado and others are valuable.
Invoking counterfactuals in pursuit of better causal criteria
We thus agree with Höfler's assessment that Hill probably
had a counterfactual concept – definition, not model – of
causation in mind (consciously or subconsciously) when
he gave his famous (and under-appreciated [1]) talk [3],
not merely because of some specific phrase he used but
because it is difficult to imagine anything else he could
have had in mind. Though Höfler argues that "counterfac-
tual causality [presumably meaning the counterfactual
definition of causality] ... only became standard in epide-
miology from the 1980s" [2], it seems very unlikely that
epidemiologists (or economists or statisticians, for those
who prefer those characterizations of Hill) had some
other definition in mind before that. Like Newton "dis-
covering" gravity, those who formalized the definition of
causation in philosophy, mathematical statistics, and
applied sciences did so in a context in which most people
already grasped the basic idea and made use of it (to make
scientific inferences or to keep from floating away into
space).
With the counterfactual concept providing merely the def-
inition, one that Hill shared with most of us, it seems
unlikely that it can teach us much new about Hill's list.
Indeed, it does not appear that Höfler finds any teeth in
the notion of counterfactuals.
Höfler's analysis begins with the strength of association
condition, a particularly good heuristic when a system is
simple (e.g., a large, well-designed randomized trial with
results that are easily measured soon after the interven-
tion). But strength of association is considerably less
definitive when confounding and other errors add com-
plexity to our assessment. Höfler addresses the uncer-
tainty that results from study errors, asking "Would the
interval estimate that properly accounts for not only ran-
dom, but also systematic error...allow for the desired con-
clusion...?" adding, "high uncertainty about bias
parameters requires larger associations than modest
uncertainty does." That is, whether or not an association
is strong is a matter of context.
There are analytic methods being developed to put some
numbers to that context, and we appreciate and encourage
the attention to quantification of epidemiologic uncer-
tainty from errors other than random sampling, a line of
thinking in epidemiology that one of us helped to launch
[17] (see endnote 1). But despite the fact that this line of
thinking sprang from Maldonado's work on causal con-
trasts (a line of thinking he traces proximately to Green-
land and Robins [19], and which also traces to Rubin,
Neyman, Hume, and other thinkers) we have to say that
Höfler's assessment seems to have nothing to do with
counterfactuals. It primarily supports his thesis that com-
plicated systems defy the simple rules of thumb. This con-
forms to what we have argued previously: uncertainty
about input assumptions (e.g., the assumptions that
measurement is accurate and confounding is controlled
for) is almost always ignored in epidemiologic results,
and people (including experts) have been shown to beEmerging Themes in Epidemiology 2006, 3:5 http://www.ete-online.com/content/3/1/5
Page 4 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
quite bad at quantifying the possible magnitude of error
without mathematical aids [17,18,20,21]. Höfler tries to
improve upon the simplest statement of the strength of
association consideration, but provides nothing that is
any more operationalizable, leaving us again with values
or common sense.
Höfler structures his analysis around "what if" questions,
calling them counterfactuals, but this gets no apparent
traction from formally representing the counterfactual
definition or pursuing its implications. For example, after
observing that the consistency criterion suffers because
different studies of different populations are expected to
produce inconsistent results, Höfler asks questions
including, "If the causal effect varied across the studies,"
(presumably actually meaning if it varied across the differ-
ent study populations, exposure definitions, etc. that are
implicitly defined by the studies) "would one expect to
observe different associations...?" This is a useful lesson
on consistency, replacing the hobgoblin of foolish con-
sistency with systematic prediction of inconsistency. This
is used when, for example, authors find it reassuring that
the association with an exposure is stronger for histologi-
cally-confirmed cancers than it is for an alternative (pre-
sumably noisier) definition of disease status. Since we
would expect to see a stronger association (more likely
than not) when there is less (independent, non-differen-
tial) measurement error, this inconsistency could make us
more comfortable with a causal conclusion. However, the
role of counterfactuals in this lesson, beyond the implicit
definition of causation, is unclear.
It appears that any value in Höfler's analysis lies not in
counterfactuals, but in hypotheticals  – that is, ex ante
hypotheses about what data would show if a certain
assumption were true. Perhaps this puts a finer point on
"common sense," replacing it with the systematic scien-
tific thinking that epidemiology needs much more than it
needs improved causal checklists. Our example, that dif-
ferent disease definitions should result in inconsistent
associations (in a predictable way), introduces a testable
hypothesis. Höfler presents another under the specificity
criterion, borrowing the example [22] that wearing hel-
mets, if it reduces injury rather than just being a proxy for
an unmeasurable tendency to act more carefully, should
result in reduced injuries of the head, but not other body
parts. Both of these examples are useful and, though
immediately compelling when presented, may be a step
beyond mere common sense. There is clearly value in
teaching health researchers to think more about propos-
ing and testing hypotheses (in the genuine sense dis-
cussed below). Conversations about evidential clues (e.g.,
lists of causal considerations) provide one good starting
point for teaching such lessons. Indeed, there is every rea-
son to believe that this was what Hill was trying to do
when he gave his talk.
Problems result when people mistakenly treat Hill's les-
sons as being from the wrong branch of philosophy, inter-
preting them as rules of logical rather than worldly
philosophy of science and the ethics of decision making
[1]. Höfler (quoting Rothman and Greenland [[23],
p.27]) notes that one condition – that cause must precede
effect – is "the only sine qua non for a counterfactual effect"
(see endnote 2). Although temporal ordering is a neces-
sary condition according to the physics we understand, or
even simple semantics (the condition follows directly
from some phrasings of the definition of cause), this does
not make this consideration any more or less useful than
others as a lesson in common sense. Lessons such as, "if a
measured upward trend in cancer rates leads (rather than
lags) the measured increase in the exposure that you think
is causing it, you are probably wrong about your causal
conclusion," are not fundamentally different from other
common sense applications of Hill's considerations.
The need for lessons in common sense
Why do health researchers, seemingly much more than
those in other fields, cling to rules for assessing causation
to the point that we have several such lists as well as a sec-
ondary literature that tries to assess and improve the rules?
Why, as suggested by Kaufman and Poole [5], did Susser
[24] provide five strategies for assessing causation – strat-
egies for testing hypotheses alongside his list of causal cri-
teria – but respond to greater interest in the criteria list by
subsequently focusing on the list and de-emphasizing the
other strategies? Part of the answer may lie in the empha-
sis on observational data (since well-designed interven-
tions provide simpler support for causal claims, at least for
some types of inquiry). However, this cannot be the
whole story, since physics and biology (to say nothing of
economics) quite often rely on observation alone.
Probably more importantly, the desire to find answers to
countless different policy, social science, and biological
questions creates the desire to study something once (in a
particular population, at a particular time, with particular
variable definitions), declare an answer, and move on.
This does not provide much opportunity to actually test
hypotheses. It encourages health researchers to conduct
simplistic statistical calculations that are described in the
language of hypothesis testing, and mistake this for actu-
ally testing a worldly hypothesis. It discourages genuine
hypothesis testing, along the lines of, "If we have observed
a true causal relationship, then we would also expect to
see.... Let's do more research to check that before reporting
our result." We would certainly expect such testing from
another science before it declared, say, the discovery of
cold fusion or that unfettered free markets make people'sEmerging Themes in Epidemiology 2006, 3:5 http://www.ete-online.com/content/3/1/5
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lives better (bad examples, perhaps – call them exceptions
that emphasize the value of the rule).
Epidemiology sees few studies designed to chip away the
ambiguities resulting from the Duhem-Quine problem
(which, roughly speaking, is the quandary that any study
used to test a particular claim is simultaneously testing
many ancillary hypotheses about the study methodology
– e.g., that the right measures were used, the instruments
do what they are supposed to – and thus we cannot be
sure the observed result informs the causal hypothesis of
interest). Studies are seldom repeated with improved (or
even different) instruments (see endnote 3). Validation
studies are occasionally conducted, quite often finding
substantial measurement error, but the results are almost
never incorporated into the primary analysis. Even easy
analyses that require no further fieldwork, such as assess-
ing whether an effect estimate is highly dependent on the
particular functional form used in the quantitative analy-
sis (i.e., statistical model assumptions, cutpoints for cate-
gorizing variables, etc.) are rarely reported.
Similarly, new studies on a topic almost never actually
replicate a result, failing to take the simple step of using a
previously defined model on a different dataset. Instead
they use a new ad hoc model, ensuring that too many
things vary at once for us to be able to distinguish our
result of interest from the ancillary hypotheses. (Epidemi-
ologists may find this point most familiar in the context
of meta-analysis, where careful researchers often discover
that there are many more dimensions of variation among
study methods than there are studies.) Claims of causa-
tion in this context are rather strained, whatever models,
criteria, or equations we might have.
What is worse is that there is not just negligence about
doing good science, but actual attempts to subvert it. Not
only is there no attempt to conduct and report alternate
analyses that test the robustness of a statistical model and
use the findings of such tests to address uncertainty, but in
many cases, many statistical calculations are performed
and the one reported is chosen because it is an outlier (i.e.,
because it shows a dramatic result), making it most likely
to be an artifact of false ancillary hypotheses about the
model [25]. Thus, not only do researchers fail to further
test the causal conclusions they draw based on their data,
but their causal conclusions are often not even supported
by their data (since most calculations using the data
would produce less extreme results than the ones
reported). This approach violates common-sense norms
of scientific inquiry, including Hill's often-overlooked
preamble consideration, that the data must show an asso-
ciation in the first place. Unfortunately, this subversion is
not terribly surprising when the desire to get an interesting
result is not tempered by concern about replicablility and
consistency (there is very little chance anyone will ever
attempt to actually replicate a result, and health research-
ers show an unfortunate tendency to cite an outlier result
as evidence of an association, regardless of how many
other studies found a null association), or by real scien-
tific training that imparts an ethic about what constitutes
good science.
The desire to substitute what is ostensibly a checklist of
criteria for real scientific analysis and thinking seems to
reflect the practice of health science rather than the nature
of epidemiologic data. Just as most health science ethics
classes offer legalistic checklists, rather than serious anal-
ysis of ethics, most epidemiology pedagogy offers a set of
tools, without much scientific thinking. There is nothing
inherently wrong with training people to be engineers –
skilled users of complicated tools they can adapt to spe-
cific practical applications. The field of epidemiology was
largely created by members of one field of engineering,
physicians (who, incidentally, constituted most of Hill's
original audience, a telling bit of context that is usually
ignored), with sage advice from various sciences (Hill's
approach reflects his background as an economist).
Epidemiologic training is almost always designed to cre-
ate engineers, practitioners who produce tangible results,
but who devote little attention to questions about the
nature of inquiry or scientific truth. Moreover, health sci-
ence practice is dominated by those who lack even ade-
quate skills in epidemiologic engineering; they tend
toward rote application of particular techniques and use
of off-the-shelf software they do not really understand – a
pattern that describes technicians, not engineers or scien-
tists. One might be tempted to counter that most practi-
tioners of every science spend most of their time carrying
out technical tasks. But the education and expectations of
scientists in most fields include fully understanding the
models and methods they use and trying to advance the
methods in pursuit of inquiry; those who mechanically
operate conceptual or physical tools they cannot explain
and would not have been able to create from scratch are
not generally called "doctor" and do not dominate the sci-
entific output of other fields. This is particularly true in
sciences that are as immature as modern health research
(see endnote 4).
In this context, health "science" tends to avoid and even
disdain scientific thinking: There is little interest in rigor-
ously challenging conclusions before expressing comfort
with them. Initiating vigorous learned debate or suggest-
ing that researchers should be required to defend their
claims against criticism is frequently considered impolite
or even hostile. Pursuit of better methods of research and
analysis, despite how terribly primitive our methods are,
is considered an esoteric sideline rather than the lifebloodEmerging Themes in Epidemiology 2006, 3:5 http://www.ete-online.com/content/3/1/5
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of the science. Results of published studies are cited as if
they were definitive, without adequate regard to the qual-
ity of the research, even when there is clear reason for
doubt. Methods sections in research reports do not pro-
vide even remotely sufficient detail to understand what
was done. Datasets are seldom re-analyzed, no matter
how important the implications. And on top of these
problems (or perhaps because of them), the cursory peer-
review process is treated as if it – rather than a crucible of
further study and debate – determines the truth of a claim.
Epidemiology education is seldom designed to produce
scientists. In our experience, if two professors present con-
flicting views on proper methodology, students typically
react with discomfort, or even hostility, insisting that
someone just tell them what is right so they can use it and
move on. From what we have seen, most training in epi-
demiology indulges (or even helps create) this mindset,
catering to students who are clearly budding technicians,
not scientists. Students are usually taught to use computa-
tional black-boxes and describe the results with rote lan-
guage. Some of them want to be scientists, and try to
engage in scientific analysis and inquiry, but being taught
(or even forced) to conform to the dominant modes of
practice makes that difficult. A student who masters a typ-
ical program in epidemiology will be a competent engi-
neer, but will have learned little about the nature of
scientific inquiry.
To be sure, engineers could be considered the bedrock of
modernity and technicians undoubtedly produce more
total day-to-day benefits than scientists, so this is not a
pronouncement about comparative worth. But it does
explain why scientific thinking needs a boost in the field.
We would be surprised if even 1/1000th of the person-
time spent doing epidemiology is devoted to critical anal-
ysis.
Conclusion
It is in this context, a field of scientific inquiry that is dom-
inated by non-scientists, that lessons in scientific com-
mon sense have immense value. Four years before
"Estimating Causal Effects" was published, Maldonado
presented a seminar on the usefulness of formalizing
counterfactuals, and following it one of us (CVP), new to
epidemiology at the time, asked, "what part of that was I
not supposed to already know?" In retrospect, the ques-
tion clearly missed the point: Like Hill's contemplations,
the formalization of counterfactuals is not a new discov-
ery or even a new lesson, but rather an articulation of a
concept that deserves more attention (or basic awareness)
than it gets in health research. Indeed, we emphasized the
need for further analysis of what is "known" in the field
(in the sense of having been said some time, in some
way), but seem to be remembered far too infrequently, as
a major reason for starting a new journal [26,27]. As every
teacher knows, spending time contemplating previous les-
sons is usually a lot more valuable than introducing a
novel idea every minute of every lecture.
Attention to a formal definition of causation and to a list
of clues that might help us draw conclusions about causa-
tion can be valuable. Such attention can help promote the
active thinking that leads to scientific common sense. So
long as the message is interpreted as the need to contem-
plate and investigate before drawing scientific conclu-
sions, these lessons are valuable.  But when they
degenerate into black-box algorithms, this enables health
researchers to avoid the intellectual work of being scien-
tists.
Endnote 1
We find it unfortunate that Höfler used the term "Monte
Carlo sensitivity analysis," to describe some uncertainty
quantification methods. Phillips has pointed out that this
is a misnomer since those methods differ fundamentally
from sensitivity analysis and "Monte Carlo" confuses the
calculation tool with the analysis [18].
Endnote 2
It is worth mentioning that the temporality condition is
also a perfect fit for counterfactual-avoiding definitions of
causation such as "predictable patterns of one event fol-
lowing another", suggesting again that nothing is learned
about causal considerations by invoking counterfactuals.
Endnote 3
Ironically, as we were writing this paper, one of us
attended a workshop on getting health research grants
from the Canadian government; part of the advice was
that the exposure-disease relationship being studied
needs to be novel. The message was that checking the
robustness of previous results was such a low priority that
it would not attract this funding.
Endnote 4
To add concreteness to the point about conceptual
machinery, consider how many of those who are consid-
ered scientists in epidemiology ever learned how to calcu-
late the statistics they report without depending on a
black-box software package or, for that matter, how many
can even define confounding, let alone explain why their
mathematical model was the best choice or calculate the
impact of measurement error. In a science that is pro-
foundly still under development, we would expect that
scientists would be educated and conversant in the entire
process of inquiry so that they could contribute to the
development. Epidemiology is clearly immature and
under development: most epidemiologic research in his-
tory has been done within the lifetimes, often even thePublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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professional lifetimes, of current researchers, and the list
of known glaring failures of the methods is long.
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